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―Kierkegaard and/or Catholicism: 
A Matter of Conjuctions‖ 
 William Cahoy is Dean of the School of Theology and Seminary and Associate Professor of Systematic 
Theology at Saint John’s University in Collegeville, MN. A Catholic theologian, Professor Cahoy wrote 
his dissertation at Yale University on Kierkegaard’s view of the self in community. He has published on 
Kierkegaard’s theological anthropology and on feminist theology in Modern Theology, written many re-
views, and gives talks around the country on issues in Catholic higher education, the Catholic Intellectual 
Tradition, faith and the liberal arts, and faith and reason 
 
How to apply:  The seminar is open to all full-time faculty.  Participants will receive a stipend of $500.00 
for the seminar. Participating faculty will be expected to discuss certain texts and to write a short article 
about the topic from their own perspective and discipline.  These articles will be collected and dissemi-
nated on-line.  Articles will be expected eight weeks after the end of the seminar.  Fifteen faculty will be 
accepted for the seminar, preference being given to those who have not participated in the past.  Apply 
by indicating your interest to Anthony Sciglitano, Religious Studies Department, at sciglian@shu.edu tel. 
973-761-9544. Deadline for indicating interest is May 1, 2008. 
 
This seminar is co-sponsored by the Center for Catholic Studies and the Center for Vocation and Ser-
vant Leadership  at Seton Hall University.  It is part of a series of such workshops focusing on the 
notion of “calling” in the various disciplines. 
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“Kierkegaard and/or Catholicism:  A matter of conjunctions” 
It is often said (accurately) that one of the distinguishing marks of a Catholic understanding of life is its 
both-and approach in contrast to the either-or approach more characteristic of a Protestant sensibil-
ity.  For example, Catholics tend to live with and argue for both scripture and tradition, faith and 
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On Knowing and Being: Reflections on Truth, Love, and Identity 
Janine P. Buckner 
I am thrilled to have had the opportunity 
to participate in the Center‘s Faculty seminar, 
―Kierkegaard and/or Catholicism:  A Matter of 
Conjunctions‖ this May.  The seminar, adeptly 
facilitated by Dr. William Cahoy, Dean of the 
School of Theology and Seminary at St. John‘s 
University, was focused upon Søren Kierkegaard‘s 
writings on Christianity, the human experience, 
and the value of recognizing and maximizing in-
dividuals‘ responsibilities in relation to an abso-
lute God.  Faith is a central aspect of my life, and I 
greatly enjoyed the discussions of Kierkegaard‘s 
views that ensued in the gathering of my es-
teemed and erudite colleagues!  Perhaps most re-
warding for me was the time we had to share our 
own definitions and perspectives with each other.  
I found the seminar personally enlightening, 
stimulating, and useful for some potential re-
search projects, and am thrilled to have had the 
ability to participate. 
 
The seminar afforded me many benefits, 
not the least of which was time to engage in dis-
course and learning at a level at which I have not 
had the luxury to experience in many years.  In-
deed, the experience of being immersed with col-
leagues in such a stimulating atmosphere was a 
rather luxurious one for me.  Even though I was 
teaching (the Psychology of Gender course) while 
also reading and participating in the reflections 
regarding Kierkegaard‘s views of the world and 
the here-after, I felt as if I could go on forever in 
that ―mode!‖  I am grateful for the wonderful ex-
perience, and I wish it could have continued.  I 
doubt that I am alone in this feeling; many of us 
have hatched plans to continue in the fall what 
discourses have already begun.     
 
For me, the most exciting aspect of the 
workshop was having the opportunity to be in the 
student/learner role in exploring some of my 
most favorite topics. (I used an entire notebook 
for notes)  In what seems like an eternity ago (!) I 
enrolled as a college student in several courses on 
the intersection of psychology and philosophy as 
they relate to identity. At that time I was keenly 
interested in the immersion of self in community, 
and  I  enjoyed  debates  on  principles  such  as 
knowing truth versus being truth.  In those seem-
ingly long-ago days, I even wrote a few papers on 
the  meaning-making  processes  of  the  human 
mind (or psyche) as engaged in living a life of 
faith (or doing a faith-full life, depending upon 
the perspective).  Regrettably, however, once I 
began to specialize in the aspects of my profes-
sional expertise (research and theory of cognitive 
development in Psychology), I necessarily had to 
put some of these broader issues aside for the sake 
of  finishing  graduate  school  (not  to  mention 
forming my family and developing a professional 
and personal life).  Having an opportunity to re-
visit some of these deeper aspects has been re-
invigorating and inspiring.   
 
Perhaps the greatest value for me in this 
workshop experience was the establishment of an 
incubation  period  and  subsequent  ―re-
percolation‖ of schemas surrounding the mean-
ing of personhood in a spiritual sense.  Indeed, 
some of Kierkegaard‘s ideas are echoed in some 
foundational theories underlying developmental 
psychology (particularly as these structures relate 
to identity development and moral reasoning).  
Many of Kierkegaard‘s ideas map directly onto 
my own personal views, and could be useful for 
developing a set of hypotheses for research.  In 
fact, some of the seminar content with which we 
contended has stimulated new ideas which I hope 
to incorporate into upcoming research projects.  
For instance, I would like to explore how students 
who are still engaged in self-discovery come to 
terms with such issues as what it means to both 
be and live as a Christian, by asking them to share 
narratives about meaningful moments in their 
lives.  Through such avenues, I may gain insight 
into not only what characteristics maturing stu-
dents endorse or strive to acquire according to 
the values of a religious worldview or culture, but 
whether (or how) a developing sense of self as a 
spiritual person is defined or shaped by these 
such schemas of knowledge.  Many constructs 
could be useful in an endeavor of this kind; more-
over, such work could lend itself in valuable ways 
to practical applications in a place like Seton Hall 
where students, staff, faculty, and administrators 
are encouraged to consider vocation, personal 
development, commitment to missions and val-
ues, and a life of faith.    
 
Of all the topics that we discussed, the 
most exciting potential for specific research re-
lates to the ideas of the 3 stages of being, or what 
we as a group called the ―3-ring circus‖ of life.  
This is particularly intriguing to me as a narrative 
researcher with developmental interests.  My ap-
preciation for this construct comes from the util-
ity of this notion as a method for identifying the 
predominate focus of one‘s life story.  One ―ring‖ 
that Kierkegaard likened to a beginning stage of 
life, or a default mode into which one is born, is a 
lifestyle built upon the ―Aesthetic.‖  This type of 
living may be seen at any age but is most pro-
nounced in young children, and prioritizes the 
pursuit of pleasure and avoiding pain.  This life-
style is fruitless as it is not ultimately possible to 
maintain; since pleasure is but a fleeting experi-
ence, much like music—once the notes are gone, 
so too is the pleasure associated with it.  Although 
some may be deluded in thinking that they can 
commit to a life of pleasure, they in essence 
merely relegate themselves to a life of instability, 
since such individuals live a life of perpetual dis-
appointment as they shift from one momentary 
pleasure in search of another more fruitful 
―place‖ to grow.   
 
The second stage or perspective focuses 
upon the ―Ethical‖ and is equally as unfulfilling 
as striving for constant pleasure.  Persons in an 
―Ethical‖ mode commit to following laws and 
strive for goodness and constancy, regardless of 
emotion or intention.  This kind of life is about 
―self‖ and human-crafted laws to follow, but this 
view leads to boredom as motivations to live and 
do are essentially external in nature, based upon 
doing what an authority figure commands, sim-
ply because it is right (or wrong).  In the spiritual 
dimension, Kierkegaard likens this to individuals 
attempting to follow the Old Testament laws 
which were unattainable in and of themselves.  
Such a life binds one to feeling hopeless in the 
realization that he or she could not perfectly per-
form all of the commands of the Law of Holiness.   
 
The third and last stage, which Kierkegaard la-
beled as the ―Religious‖ life is one of hope and 
maturity; it is uniquely motivated by an individ-
ual‘s desire and intention to follow after God‘s 
Will.  This stage is a collaborative effort between 
individuals and God; on the human side, indi-
viduals must recognize that in and of themselves 
they would never achieve or know what is per-
fection or truth, so they must choose to submit 
themselves to the Grace of God to help shape 
their lives and instruct their choices.  In this 
realm, the individual shifts to a more ―mature‖ 
development, demonstrating a conviction to place 
the Will of God at the center point of who one 
strives to be (call it identity, becoming a self, 
meaning making, development, or what-have-
you, depending upon the discipline through 
which one labels such constructs).  I have been 
thinking some about this construct and hope to 
talk with colleagues about ways to potentially in-
corporate this into some kind of narrative inquiry 
project.  One means of using this triarchic model 
would be to look for themes reflective of these 
three perspectives in individuals‘ descriptions 
about meaningful moments or turning points in 
their lives.  What kinds of stories would 
―aesthetically-tuned‖ individuals tell, and how 
would these differ from those concentrated upon 
―ethical concerns‖ or those more in a ―religious‖ 
mode?  How might such themes be related to suc-
cessful or unsuccessful coping, or outcomes in 
cases where either positive or negative experi-
ences (even stress) occur. 
 
Besides the potential for informing re-
search, a different aspect of the seminar which I 
found probably most gratifying of all was the 
multidisciplinary context into which we, as par-
ticipants, placed our discussions.  My co-
participants in the seminar represented a wide 
range of fields, from Math to English, Seminary to 
Chemistry.  This broad base was wonderful and 
led to deep interchanges regarding post-
modernism, definitions of the Aesthetic, what is 
meant by vocation, Culture & Christendom, au-
thority, truth and Truth (with a Capital ―T‖), and 
materiality.  I believe that we all came to the un-
derstanding that each of us, living in community 
with others, and fashioning a life well-lived in the 
face of an ever-changing and relativistic culture, 
must individually strive to discover and under-
stand some kind of spiritual reality, one which 
everyone may not readily comprehend in our 
own subjective humanness.  Kierkegaard‘s view 
on this spiritual reality was one of an objective 
truth, one that unfortunately is necessarily some-
what ―colored‖ by our own viewpoints and 
knowledge.  Nonetheless, he urged us to consider 
that there is a God-reality that exists, even if as 
humans we do not readily ―see it.‖ To this end, 
we discussed several times the metaphor of look-
ing through glasses to correct faulty vision.  A 
person with nearsightedness, for instance, only  
―sees‖ the distant world as blurry, though in real-
ity it is not blurry.  But unless this person is in-
formed by a mediator (an ophthalmologist) that 
they need corrected vision, they may not realize 
the potential that their sight could have.  In this 
sense, Kierkegaard referred to the human condi-
tion as seeing only dimly without the awakening 
and spiritual adjustment that comes via the Spirit 
of God.  In effect, he spoke of being a Christian 
without a true relationship with God like living 
without the awareness of the ultimate reality be-
yond our visual perception.  To exemplify this we 
spoke about the passage of scripture in 1 Corin-
thians 13:11-12, where the Apostle Paul speaks 
of these human limits in contrast to the standard, 
true depth of knowing found in God: 
 
When I was a child, I spoke as a child, 
I understood as a child, I thought as a 
child; but when I became a man, I put 
away childish things. For now we see 
in a mirror, dimly, but then face to 
face. Now I know in part, but then I 
shall know just as I also am known. (1 
Cor. 13: 11-12, NKJV)  
 
Another, more contemporary biblical translation 
states it thus:  
 
When I was an infant at my mother's 
breast, I gurgled and cooed like any 
infant. When I grew up, I left those 
infant ways for good. We don't yet see 
things clearly. We're squinting in a 
fog, peering through a mist. But it 
won't be long before the weather 
clears and the sun shines bright! We'll 
see it all then, see it all as clearly as 
God sees us, knowing him directly just 
as he knows us!  But for right now, 
until that completeness, we have three 
things to do to lead us toward that 
consummation: Trust steadily in God, 
hope unswervingly, love extrava-
gantly. And the best of the three is 
love. (1 Cor. 13:11-13, The Message)  
 
In the end, much of what our discussion focused 
upon was this Love—what it is, how to recognize 
it, where to find it, how to display it, how human 
forms may differ from spiritual forms of love, and 
so on.   What I took away from these discussions 
was not only relevant to myself as a cognitive de-
velopmental psychologist, but to a person striving 
to be more than what I am now.  Likewise, I en-
joyed getting to know others through their own 
As participants, we represented a wide 
range of spiritual beliefs with many different po-
tential definitions of love, and we spent a good 
amount of time considering how subjective men-
tality in itself may hinder efforts to fully grasp 
ultimate, objective reality in which we live and 
love.  Though we didn‘t take a vote on how many 
of us believe in an ―objective reality‖ beyond 
what we know and experience individually, what 
we did share in common is that we no doubt see 
dimly in our human condition, and often lack 
enlightenment as to reality beyond our moments 
of being that demand our attention.  This is one 
reason why discourse from so many different 
scholarly domains was enlightening to me.  And I 
know too well, like everyone, how the now-
demands of many different roles often consume 
much of my focus, energies, and perceptions.  As 
such, I have many perspectives or glasses that I 
myself often take on and off throughout the day. 
If for no other reason, this is probably the single 
largest contributor to my pleasure in being given 
the opportunity to step away for a few hours in 
the seminar days to re-calibrate my world- and 
self-views.   
_________________________________________ 
(n.d.). The Message (1 Cor.  13:11-13). Retrieved July 22, 
2008 from Web site: http://www.biblegateway.com/
passage/?search=1%20Corinthians%2013%
20;&version=65; 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
Kierkegaard’s Dialectic and the Distrust of  Intimacy 
 
Ed Jones 
In the material we read of Kierkegaard last 
May, he comes across a bit as an Old Testament 
prophet—maybe not a righteous avenger, but 
outraged believer railing against the state of the 
Danish Church, and probably for good reason.  
He is incensed—almost flabbergasted—that Den-
mark can consider its priests priests when they‘re 
wrapped in earthly comforts and rewarded with 
earthly powers.  He sees the Danish Christian as 
nothing like the New Testament Christian (Attack 
upon Christendom). 
 
In this sense, he is part of a long tradition 
of prophets, among whom I would count Jesus, 
who earned the wrath of Pharisees and Sadducees 
for his sharp criticism of their hypocrisy.  Such 
righteousness revels in setting up sharp contrasts 
between behavior that will lead to the Kingdom of 
Heaven and behavior that will lead in another 
direction.  In one of Jesus‘ most stark expressions 
of the choices that we have to make he declares 
 
For I have come to set a man against is father, 
a daughter against her mother, and a daugh-
ter-in-law against her mother-in-law, and a 
man‘s foes will be those of his own household.  
He who loves father or mother more than me 
is not worthy of me, and he who loves son or 
daughter more than me is not worthy of me 
(Mt 10: 35-37). 
 
So Kierkegaard is hardly a radical when it 
comes to framing earthly behavior in light of the 
perspective of eternity.  However, there is still 
something odd about his brand of either/or 
thinking, which clearly he embraces, since one of 
his most important books is titled Either/Or.  And 
the oddness has a most particular flavor when he 
writes about ―fellowship‖ and the 
―congregation.‖ 
 
Kierkegaard works passionately for the 
redemption of humankind, and for the restoration 
of a Church that supports that redemption.  But 
he must do so by continually positing the Militant 
Church against the Christianity of his time, em-
bodied in the phrase a ―Christian nation‖ or the 
―Church Triumphant,‖ both of which appear to 
him to be oxymorons.  Kierkegaard wants people 
to return to a New Testament faith, and his way 
of doing this is to wield a theology sword that di-
vides everything ruthlessly into Christ or not 
Christ.  He provides a most interesting compari-
son to clarify what he claims for Christianity. 
 
If there were living in the land a poet who in 
view of the ideal of what it is to love talked in 
the fashion:  ―Alas, I must myself admit that I 
cannot truly be said to be in love; neither will 
I play the hypocrite and say that I am endeav-
oring more and more in this direction for the 
truth unfortunately is that things are rather 
going backward with me.  Moreover, my ob-
servation convinces me that in the whole land 
there is not a single person who can be said to 
be truly in love‘—then the inhabitants of the 
land could reply to him, and in a certain de-
gree with justice: ―Yes, my good poet, that 
may be true enough with your ideals; but we 
are content, we find ourselves happy with 
what we call being in love, and that settles it.‖  
But, such can never be the case with Christi-
anity‖ (my emphasis).  (Articles in The Father-
land 31-32) 
 
There is no middle ground.  One cannot be con-
tent with what people prefer to call Christianity.  
Kierkegaard is ruthless for Christ, which is only 
befitting a philosopher theologian, one who could 
never in eternity be a politician or perhaps a 
bishop. 
 
His vision of contemporary society makes 
is difficult for Kierkegaard to talk about fellow-
ship and congregation in ways that give them 
much meaning or importance in one‘s day-to-day 
life.  Fellowship, for example, is always a lower 
category than the single individual, because it‘s at 
the level of the latter that we commit to a spiritual 
struggle (Practice in Christianity No. III 223)  
Kierkegaard is so set on reaffirming Jesus‘ mes-
sage for a corrupt world that all the terms that 
belong to the world he redefines in absolute 
terms, like ―congregation‖:  ―To apply such a 
term as ‗congregation‖ (about which people busy 
themselves so much these days) to this life is 
really an impatient anticipation of the eter-
nal‖ (223).  Thus the congregation is merely the 
collection of individuals who have gone to heaven 
(223).  In this language of absolutes, of either/
ors, once he‘s defined the congregation as belong-
ing to eternity, it seems difficult to claim congre-
gation as a living breathing group of people who, 
imperfectly, seek God and goodness and whole-
ness in their lives. 
 
The contrast between Kierkegaard‘s talk 
about congregation starkly contrasts with the way 
the Zen master Thich Nhat Hanh talks about 
sangha, the Buddhist term for a ―community of 
fellow practitioners‖ (Touching Peace 102).  One 
of the central practices of a Buddhist is to ―take 
refuge‖ in—or commit to, study, and respect—
the Buddha, the Dharma (the truth), and the 
Sangha (the community that lives in harmony 
and awareness).  For Thich Nhat Hanh, the 
sangha is no other-worldly abstraction that does-
n‘t exist until eternity come.  Rather, it is a very 
practical thing.  Of it, he says ―it is difficulty or 
even impossible to practice [i.e. one‘s religion] 
with a sangha‖ (Touching Peace 103).  Whereas 
for Kierkegaard, the congregation is less a living 
reality (―[it] does not really come until eternity‖) 
than ―the gathering of all the single individuals 
who endured in the struggle and passed the test,‖ 
for Thich Nhat Hanh, and presumably the Zen 
Buddhist tradition in general, ―interpersonal rela-
tionships are the key for success in the practice.  
Without an intimate, deep relationship with at 
least one person, transformation is 
unlikely‖ (Touching Peace 107).  His statements 
are grounded in the practical matters of making a 
spiritual community work, as he describes else-
where a time-tested process whereby brothers in 
a monastery deal with anger and frustration 
amongst themselves and reconcile with each 
other. 
 
For Kierkegaard—so concerned with the 
Church that has become a part of the World in-
stead of apart from the World, so cognizant of the 
frailty of human beings, of their desperate attrac-
tion to comfort and their need to conform to the 
World instead of to Christ—the rest of the world 
must melt away.  Thus ―to become and to be a 
Christian is to become so turned inward that it 
seems as if all the others do not exist at all for a 
person, so turned inward that one is quite literally 
alone in the whole world, alone before God‖ and 
―every moment he is turned outward is 
wasted‖ (Practice in Christianity No. III 225).  Of 
course, we understand what Kierkegaard is doing 
with his concerned for being turned outward, be-
cause for him, such a turning is an orientation to 
the values of the world.  However, the word 
―outward‖ never appears to refer to an actual 
outward, an empirical outward, despite Kierke-
gaard‘s professed concern with the actual state of 
the Church.  Rather, it becomes part of a dialecti-
cal argument, as ―outward‖ simply becomes de-
fined In relation to its opposite, ―inward.‖  There 
is never the empirical ―outward‖ or, for that mat-
ter, an empirical ―inward.‖  This explains why 
Kierkegaard is all about railing, all about strug-
gle, all about life as a test (how the Church 
merely serves as a parenthetical entity between 
the time of Christ‘s death and is second coming).   
 
According to Kierkegaard, ―the world is 
going neither forward nor backward; it remains 
essentially the same, like the sea, like the air, in 
short, like an element.  It is, namely, and must be 
the element that can provide the test of being a 
Christian‖ (Practice in Christianity No. III 232).  
The world serves no purpose except as a test for 
human salvation. When he says ―Woe, woe to the 
Christian Church when it will have been victori-
ous in this world, for then it is not he Church that 
has been victorious but the world‖ (Practice in 
Christianity No. III 223), he seems to be adopting 
a stand about the ultimate redemption of the 
world that seems to be at odds with the Catholic 
notion of progression of the world toward God.  
Similarly, when he says ―Christ has never wanted 
to be victorious in this world.  We came into the 
world in order to suffer; that he called being vic-
torious‖ (Practice in Christianity No. III 224), he 
seems to assert a complete break between what is 
possible in the world and what is possible in 
Christ.  And, admittedly, Jesus‘s own words—―My 
kingdom is not of this world‖—provide heavy 
support for this assertion. However, in contrast to 
Kierkegaard, Catholics believe in human pro-
gress, at least according to the New Advent 
Catholic Encyclopedia: 
 
The line representing progress has its ups and 
downs, there are periods of decadence and of 
retrogression, and such was the period, Reve-
lation tells us, that followed the first sin. The 
human race however, began to rise again little 
by little, for neither intelligence nor free will-
had been destroyed by original sin and, conse-
quently, there still remained the possibility of 
material progress, whilst in the spiritual order 
God did not abandon man, to whom He had 
promised redemption.. 
 
 Because of Kierkegaard‘s radical either/or 
outlook on the world, it makes sense that he de-
fines congregation as irrelevant until eternity 
come; for him, the congregation may be too 
tainted by the world to be considered something 
positive outside of eternity. 
 
If progress in human society is not possi-
ble, either as a cause or consequence of the dis-
tance at which Kierkegaard keeps the world, then 
it understandable that he adopts a tone of some 
severity, as he does in the following passage:  
―When Christ requires us to save our life eter-
nally (and that surely is what we propose to at-
tain as Christians) and to hate our own life in this 
world, is there then a single one among us whose 
life in the remotest degree could be called even 
the weakest effort in this direction‖ (38).‖ 
 
I must admit that I am suspicious of the 
source of Kierkegaard‘s apparent pessimism 
about the human race.  I remember the story of 
his impassioned but ultimately broken relation-
ship with Regine Olsen.  About one and three-quarters 
years into his relation with, he wrote in his journal 
 
it seems to me that I should have to possess the 
beauty of all girls in order to draw out a 
beauty equal to yours; that I should have to 
circumnavigate the world in order to find the 
place I lack and which the deepest mystery of 
my whole being points towards, and at the 
next moment you are so near to me, filling my 
spirit so powerfully that I am transfigured for 
myself, and feel that it's good to be here. 
(shamelessly taken from the Wikipedia article 
on Kierkegaard) 
 
About a year and a half later he proposed to her, 
and then before the year was up he had dissolved 
the engagement.  Such passions are not unusual 
among young men, or perhaps any men, but 
clearly Kierkegaard was a man capable of the 
strongest romantic feelings.  I can‘t help but feel 
that he held himself to insanely high expectations 
for himself in this relationship, based upon ideal 
that he expresses for true love:  ―The deeper the 
revolution of love, the less the distinctions of mine 
and yours matter, and the more ‗justice shud-
ders‘‖ because distinctions of rightful possession 
blur (Works of Love 248-249).  Such ideals are 
fine, but I suspect that may have provided a case 
where the perfect became the enemy of the good.  
I also suspect that the hypothetical poet in the 
passage near the beginning of this essay was not  
Kierkegaard.  He is not one who could say, even 
of earthly love, ―We are content, we find our-
selves happy with what we call being in love, and 
that settles it.‖  If Kierkegaard was uncomfortable 
with intimate relationships before Regine, his 
failed relationship—and lack of a serious love re-
lationship after that—must have reinforced the 
distance at which he kept the world.   
 
Kierkegaard takes a common term (like 
congregation) and redefines it to create his own 
theology.  It‘s safer to keep the world at a distance 
by defining congregation as an aspect of eternity, 
but such a strategy is only partly satisfying.  The 
world and Christ are defined as diametrical oppo-
sites, not observed, in all their complexity, as only 
partial opposites.   
 
One final observation about the difficulty 
Kierkegaard with relationships:  In the chapter 
―Love Seeks Not Its Own,‖ Kierkegaard makes a 
big fuss over the importance of hiding the identity 
of the benefactor who might wish to say, ―‗This 
man, by my help, stands on his own.‘‖  He claims 
that once this statement is proclaimed in the pres-
ence of the beneficiary, ―he does not stand by 
himself:  then he has not in fact become his own, 
then he is indebted to [the benefactor‘s] 
help‖ (Works of Love 256).  In other words, 
Kierkegaard finds it impossible for someone who 
truly loves another to openly help him become 
independent.  I admit that the man means well.  
After all Jesus talks about not trumpeting the good 
one does but doing good secretly (Matthew 6: 1-
4).  However, in reality, it‘s perfectly possible in 
the context of an intimate relationship to help 
someone become independent and for both bene-
factor and beneficiary to acknowledge this.  In an 
intimate relationship, the roles of benefactor and 
beneficiary may switch depending on the occa-
sion.  My beloved and I may agreed that it would 
be helpful to her if I reminded her how important 
it is for her to get to her yoga class, so I remind 
her occasionally and am openly delighted when 
she remembers to go.  Over a period of time, she 
develops the habit of going to the class regularly 
and no longer needs any encouragement or re-
minders.  She is more independent.  We can 
openly acknowledge that I helped her stand on 
her own.  And there are other aspects of our rela-
tionship in which we can acknowledge that she 
helps me stand on my own.  In turn, the mutual 
joy we take in assisting each other, and the self- 
 
 
 
 
 
 
confidence that comes with that joy, lead to each 
of us standing on our own.  Kierkegaard, having 
kept the world at a distance, is not versed in the 
arts of worldly love that partake of the divine 
Love.  
I understand better now what seems odd 
about Kierkegaard‘s dialectic that appears to take 
on the world in a quasi-empirical fashion but in  
 fact takes on the absolutes that embody a harsh-
ness not really appropriate to the Christian mes-
sage.  Yes, becoming a Christian is entails radical 
breaks from the world in many ways, and I have 
no doubt that the Church in the Netherlands 
needed a prophet, as does any powerful religious 
institution (such as the Catholic Church), but 
Kierkegaard needed a reminder about the good-
ness that lies with all human hearts, however 
buried, and of our capacity to lean on each other, 
making our weaknesses strengths. 
 Anyone familiar with the writings of Ber-
nard Lonergan knows his ―generous‖ interpreta-
tion of other writers. Almost invariably, in citing 
others he would bring out the best in their 
thought while not focusing on their shortcom-
ings.  For the most part he practiced what Paul 
Ricouer would call a positive ―hermeneutics of 
recovery‖ as distinct from a critical 
―hermeneutics of suspicion.‖  Although on occa-
sion he had serious disagreements with others - 
see his criticism in of Piet Schoonenberg‘s inter-
pretation of the early church councils - generally 
he was quite generous in bringing out the positive 
points in any particular writer. (Second Collec-
tion, 239ff) 
 
 I preface this short article on Lonergan 
and Kierkegaard with this observation for it is ob-
vious to me from many years of reading Lonergan 
that, although he might have had his disagree-
ments with Kierkegaard on this or that issue – for 
example, the latter‘s Lutheran account of faith, 
his discounting of the role of intellect, etc. – still 
Lonergan pays tribute to Kierkegaard as a major 
turning-point in modern philosophy and a con-
tributor to his own – seemingly so different – phi-
losophy.  As he put it on one occasion, 
―Kierkegaard had a point.‖ (Philosophical and 
Theological Papers 1965-1980, 400) 
 
 Lonergan has no book or article specifi-
cally dedicated to Kierkegaard, but he does refer 
to him extensively in his Boston College ―Lectures 
on Existentialism‖ from 1956 and references to 
Kierkegaard are scattered throughout his writ-
ings.  In these pages I would like to briefly point 
out three points in Lonergan‘s own thought 
where he pays tribute to Kierkegaard. I will con-
clude by pointing to the notion of love where 
some discern convergences between the two writ-
ers. The article will consist mostly of quotes from 
Lonergan that touch upon Kierkegaard. These are 
―explorations‖ that might form the basis of a fu-
ture article.   
 
 The convergences we discern between the 
two writers are, then: 
 
1)  Kierkegaard as representing the move 
toward interiority in modern philosophy, 
what Lonergan calls the third stage of 
meaning;  
 
2) Kierkegaard‘s highlighting of the im-
portance of authenticity; and  
 
3) the central role of conversion in 
Kierkegaard; 
 
4) the notion of love in Kierkegaard and 
Lonergan. 
 
1.  Kierkegaard and the Third Stage of Meaning 
 
 According to Lonergan, human culture 
has moved through three major stages in the de-
velopment of culture.  The first stage is the stage 
of common sense: that is, the stage in which eve-
rything is related to one‘s own particular culture 
and spatio-temporal framework.  Anything be-
yond that is spoken of symbolically, through po-
etry, metaphor, etc.  This is the stage where most 
people reside most of the time.   
 
The universal style is symbolic.  Its language is 
instinct with feeling.  At its liveliest it is po-
etry.  At its profoundest it is rhetoric.  It lacks 
neither attention to detail nor keen insight nor 
balanced judgment nor responsible decision.  
But it has all these, not stripped of feeling, but 
permeated with feeling.  The calm, the detach-
ment, the clarity, the coherence, the rigor of 
the logician, the mathematician, the scientist - 
these are just beyond its horizon.  Such by and 
large is the language of the New Testament 
which employs parable and aphorism and 
apocalyptic to shift thought and meaning 
from man's everyday world to the world of 
religious meaning.  Such also in the main was 
the language of the Church Fathers, and down 
the ages it has remained the straightforward 
simple language of mainstream Christianity.  
(―Questionnaire on Philosophy,‖ Philosophical 
and Theological Papers 1965-1980, 363) 
 
However, according to Lonergan, the 
Greek philosophers represent the move to a 
whole new stage of meaning, that is, the stage of 
theory.  Theory seeks clarity through universal 
and univocally defined terms.  Remember Socra-
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tes‘ driving people crazy in his quest for universal 
definitions.  Such a world of theory – achieved 
quintessentially first in Aristotle‘s philosophy and 
then in the modern sciences – goes beyond com-
mon sense‘s relating of things to ourselves by 
seeking the relationships of things to each other 
in an explanatory framework. Mathematical 
physics is the quintessential example of such a 
world of theory.  The search for theoretical un-
derstanding even influenced the Christian church 
as councils used theoretical terminology in order 
to protect the truths of the Christian faith. Think 
of the term ―homoousios‖ (―consubstantial‖) 
which the Council of Nicea used to express the 
divinity of Christ. Think also of Thomas Aquinas 
employing Aristotelian theory to articulate a sys-
tematic account of Christian theology.   
 
This second stage of meaning, the stage of 
theory, found its apogee in the massive  theoreti-
cal constructs of modern science.  Beginning with 
Descartes and especially with Immanuel Kant, 
however, a new stage of meaning began to 
emerge, that is, the world of interiority.  While 
common sense people and theoreticians both 
sought to excel in their own realms, modern phi-
losophers began to ask how it was possible that 
both of these worlds emerged from the human 
person.  Naturally they were led to ask: Who is 
this person from which these realms proceed?  
What was it in human interiority, in human con-
sciousness, that makes possible the emergence of 
the realm of common sense and the world of the-
ory? What is it about human consciousness, hu-
man subjectivity, the ―I‖ at the center of human 
operations, that makes the emergence of these 
worlds possible?    
 
It was in within this modern context of the 
turn toward interiority that Soren Kierkegaard 
began to insist on authenticity and on faith. The 
following quote from Lonergan highlights Kierke-
gaard‘s role within the emergence of modern phi-
losophy. 
 
The absolute idealist, Hegel, brilliantly ex-
plores whole realms of meaning; he gives poor 
marks to naive realists; but he fails to advance 
to a critical realism, so that Kierkegaard can 
complain that what is logical also is static, that 
movement cannot be inserted into a logic, that 
Hegel's system has room not for existence (self
-determining freedom) but only for the idea of 
existence.   
 
Kierkegaard marks a trend. Where he was 
concerned with faith, Nietzsche was with 
power, Dilthey with concrete human living, 
Husserl with the constitution of our intending, 
Bergson with his elan vital, Blondel with ac-
tion, American pragmatists with results, Euro-
pean existentialists with authentic subjectivity. 
While the mathematicians were discovering 
that their axioms were not self-evident truths, 
while the physicists were discovering that 
their laws were not inevitable necessities but 
verifiable possibilities, the philosophers ceased 
to think of themselves as the voice of pure rea-
son and began to be the representatives of 
something far more concrete and human. 
(Method in Theology, 264-265) 
 
This move to interiority has implications 
for Christianity and Christian theology and 
Kierkegaard played a key role in the emergence of 
this modern cultural consciousness. For example, 
during the Second Vatican Council it became evi-
dent to many that doctrine and theology are ex-
pressions of something more fundamental, that is, 
the encounter with the living Christ.  Theologians 
such as Dominique Marie Chenu stated that those 
who insist on putting doctrine first put the cart 
before the horse; the first thing is encountering 
the living Jesus. The Words of the Good Shepherd 
come before doctrine.  If one begins with doc-
trine, one can reduce the pastoral to doctrine – 
―the simplifications and clarifications of classical 
oratory.‖ 
 
But what comes first is the word of God. The 
task of the church is the kerygma, announcing 
the good news, preaching the gospel. That 
preaching is pastoral. It is the concrete reality. 
From it one may abstract doctrines, and theo-
logians may work the doctrines into concep-
tual systems. But the doctrines and systems, 
however valuable and true, are but the skele-
ton of the original message. A word is the 
word of a person, but doctrine objectifies and 
deperson-alizes. The word of God comes to us 
through the God-man. The church has to me-
diate to the world not just a a doctrine but the 
living Christ.‖ (A Third Collection, 227-228) 
 
2.  Kierkegaard and Authenticity  
 
 In his Boston College ―Lectures on Existen-
tialism‖ from 1956 Lonergan described the fun-
damental thrust of modern existentialist philoso-
phy by using an example from contemporary 
politics.  At that time President Eisenhower was 
asked why American troops had to join the British 
in invading the Suez Canal and he replied, ―Well, 
we have to be men.‖  Lonergan connected that 
expression, ―we have to be men,‖ with the whole 
thrust of existentialist philosophy beginning with 
Kierkegaard and flowing into secularist existen-
tialist philosophers of the 20th century. 
 
The question is: what does it mean to be a 
man?  To be myself?  Not just a ―substance‖ like 
very other human being, but a ―subject,‖ my 
―self,‖ a conscious being with a history, needs, 
desires, etc.?  What does it mean to be myself 
truly? That is, authentically?  What is such au-
thenticity? 
 
Such a question has social implications, 
that is, what does it mean to be who I profess to 
be?  What does it mean to be a genuine Dane?  A 
genuine Christian?  It is this question that forms 
the backdrop for many of the formulations that 
Lonergan gave to his own work during his later 
years.  Let me give one such formulation.     
 
As Kierkegaard asked whether he was a Chris-
tian, so divers men can ask themselves 
whether or not they are genuine Catholics or 
Protestants, Muslims or Buddhists, Platonists 
or Aristotelians, Kantians or Hegelians, artists 
or scientists, and so forth. Now they may an-
swer that they are, and their answers may be 
correct. But they can also answer affirmatively 
and still be mistaken. In that case there will 
exist a series of points in which they are what 
the ideals of the tradition demand, but there 
will be another series in which there is a 
greater or less divergence. These points of di-
vergence are overlooked from a selective inat-
tention, or from a failure to understand, or 
from an undetected rationalization. What I am 
is one thing, what a genuine Christian or Bud-
dhist is, is another, and I am unaware of the 
difference. My unawareness is unexpressed. I 
have no language to express what I am, so I 
use the language of the tradition I unauthenti-
cally appropriate, and thereby I devaluate, 
distort, water down, corrupt that language. 
  
Such devaluation, distortion, corruption may 
occur only in scattered individuals. But it may 
occur on a more massive scale, and then the 
words are repeated, but the meaning is gone. 
The chair was still the chair of Moses, but it 
was occupied by the scribes and Pharisees. 
The theology was still scholastic, but the scho-
lasticism was decadent. The religious order 
still read out the rules, but one wonders 
whether the home fires were still burning. The 
sacred name of science may still be invoked 
but, as Edmund Husserl has argued, all sig-
nificant scientific ideals can vanish to be re-
placed by the conventions of a clique. So the 
unauthenticity of individuals becomes the un-
authenticity of a tradition. Then, in the meas-
ure a subject takes the tradition, as it exists, 
for his standard, in that measure he can do no 
more than authentically realize unauthentic-
ity. (Method in Theology, 80-81) 
 
 According to Lonergan, then, following up 
on Kierkegaard‘s point, there are two types of au-
thenticity. Minor authenticity regards the individ-
ual in relation to the community in which he has 
been brought up.  Major authenticity, on the 
other hand, regards the authenticity of the com-
munity itself in the light of history – or in the 
light of God.  
 
There is the minor authenticity or unauthen-
ticity of the subject with respect to the tradi-
tion that nourishes him. There is the major 
authenticity that Justifies or condemns the 
tradition itself in the first case there is passed 
a human judgment on subjects. In the second 
case history and, ultimately, divine providence 
pass judgment on traditions. (Method in The-
ology, 80) 
 
3.  Kierkegaard and the Process of Conversion   
  
On several occasions Lonergan called at-
tention to the parallel between his own categories 
and those of Kierkegaard.  His own major catego-
ries involve the personal identification of the 
various levels of human conscious activity: ex-
periencing, understanding, judging, deciding. 
These levels of conscious activity are reflected in 
the three levels of the social-cultural world where 
Lonergan distinguishes particular goods 
(corresponding to experiencing), the good of or-
der (corresponding to understanding) and value 
(corresponding to judging and deciding).   
 
After setting these out in Lectures on Exis-
tentialism Lonergan draws the analogy between 
his own three-fold division and Kierkegaard‘s 
three spheres of existence: the aesthetic, the ethi-
cal and the religious.  For Kierkegaard, the aes-
thetic sphere, symbolized by the character of Don 
Juan, is focused on pleasures and satisfactions.  
Paradoxically, the more one seeks happiness 
within this horizon, the less happy one becomes.  
It is only through personal transformation, ac-
companied by angst, that one is able to make a 
leap to the ethical sphere, the sphere that requires 
a correspondence between one‘s reason and one‘s 
behavior.  Finally, it is only through realizing 
one‘s ethical powerlessness that one turns in faith 
to the religious level and takes one‘s stand before 
God in history.  Lonergan called attention to the 
incommensurability of these levels and the clear 
articulation of these distinctions by Kierkegaard.  
 
Now these philosophical differences will radi-
ate through the whole of life.  Earlier, we con-
sidered three levels of the good: the particular 
good (the level of satisfactions), the good of 
order, and value.  We distinguished aesthetic, 
ethical, and religious values, where the aes-
thetic value is apprehended by insight into the 
concrete, the ethical value is the individual 
demanding correspondence between his ra-
tionality and his activity, and the religious 
value is the rational individual using truth to 
know being, orienting himself before God 
within the world and history. 
 
The distinction of the aesthetic, the ethical, 
and the religious comes, of course, from 
Kierkegaard.  He used the three categories in 
speaking of three spheres of existential subjec-
tivity.  A person moves from one sphere to 
another only by a leap.  In other words, when 
a person is within a given sphere of existential 
subjectivity, as Kierkegaard would put it, or 
within a given horizon, to use the terminology 
we developed earlier, then it is not by arguing 
from that sphere that one will bring him to 
another sphere.  That sphere becomes a closed 
system, and a person has to be dynamited out 
of it.   (Topics in Education, 179) 
 
To put the issue in other terms: how does 
one escape from Plato‘s cave?  Just by ―being 
told‖ about the world outside?  Lonergan says 
that Plato set himself a tremendous problem when 
he realized that getting out of the cave was not 
just a matter of imparting information.  And that 
is why he wrote his dialogues – he had to per-
suade people to allow themselves to be put in a 
position to be pulled out of the cave. They had to 
be persuaded to make some decisions: decisions 
that in the context of people‘s present circum-
stances involved anxiety and fear. 
 
It is easy to introduce a new viewpoint, a 
higher viewpoint on the side of the object, as 
does when he distinguishes between the sensi-
ble and the intelligible…But when Plato wants 
to convert people to the noeta as what really 
exists, he has quite a job on his hands.  He has 
to write a series of highly literary dialogues 
and to introduce the myth of the cave in order 
to explain what he means.  And even when he 
gets his meaning across, it is quite another 
thing for people to live according to those 
principles.  (Phenomenology and Logic, 289) 
 
Anxiety – existential angst - arises as soon 
as you start facing the possibility of changing 
what so far has been a successful concrete syn-
thesis in your living.   
 
When a person has one's living organized on a 
lower level, the movement to a higher level 
involves something like the apparent eruption 
of a latent power, the possibility of a radical 
discovery, where the discovered has been pre-
sent all along -but where there has been a 
hiding of what has been discovered. These 
notions of obnubilation, discovery, uncovering 
what has been there all along, conversion, 
transformation of one's living, are all right in 
the center of existentialism, and they lead to 
the most fundamental questions that can be 
raised with regard to the philosophic enter-
prise. (Phenomenology and Logic, 244-246) 
 
There is need, then, for a leap from one level to 
the next.  You can‘t pull yourself up by the boot-
straps. You can‘t change yourself by just taking 
thought. And, Lonergan notes, this analysis is 
relevant to divisions among scholastic theologi-
ans. That, he notes, was the existential issue that 
concerned him the most: theology was his central 
issue. ―That is where the shoe pinches‖ -  
 
Conversion involves a change in that concrete 
synthesis.  It means that living is organized in 
a new way, in the light of new concepts, new 
principles, new norms of action, new modes 
of response to situations, new types of inter-
ests, new orientations. (Phenomenology and 
Logic, 289)  
 
There is then, an ―existential gap,‖ that is, 
a difference between what I think I am and what 
I truly am.  This is the line between the docta ig-
norantia, that is, the questions which have a 
meaning for me even though I don‘t know the 
answers to them and the indocta ignorantia, that 
is, the vast world of questions about which ―I 
couldn‘t care less.‖  The issue is a spiritual one:  
 
 
am I going to be open to where questions are 
leading me? Really?   
 
It would seem that formational processes, 
such as ―12 Step‖ programs or the Spiritual Exer-
cises of Saint Ignatius are oriented to helping the 
subject to such openness of spirit.  Or, as Loner-
gan once put it when asked about how conver-
sion happens, ―You get converted by being kicked 
around.‖ 
 
4.  Lonergan and Kierkegaard on Love: 
 
 Recently, at a Lonergan workshop at Bos-
ton College, David Aiken, Professor of Philosophy 
at Gordon College and Sarah Pike Cabral, Doc-
toral Candidate at Loyola College, Chicago, gave a 
workshop on ―The Dynamics of Love in Kierke-
gaard and Lonergan.‖  The description of their 
workshop described the subtle differences and 
conjunctions between Kierkegaard and Lonergan 
on the subject of love.   
 
Lonergan‘s preoccupation with spiritual eros 
is perhaps the most salient aspect of his phi-
losophy.  Though it goes by many names – the 
pure and unrestricted desire to know, the 
natural desire to see God, the dynamism of the 
human subject, the notion of being, or simply 
―exigence‖ – it underwrites virtually every 
page of Lonergan‘s voluminous authorship.  
Kierkegaard, for his part, recognizes the all-
encompassing sway of this desire only to sub-
ject it to radical delimitation by pointing out 
its paradoxical character – namely, that as 
emblematic of our fallenness and offense at 
God‘s unsolicited generosity, the eros of the 
human mind ineluctably strives for its own 
downfall.  Would it be just, then, to character-
ize Lonergan as an apostle of exigent eros and 
Kierkegaard as an apostle of unmerited agape? 
As Treebeard might caution us,―Not so hasty!‖  
For by examining the fine print of each au-
thorship we discover that Kierkegaardian eros 
is by no means unambiguously vicious – in-
deed, it provides essential clues for appre-
hending God‘s unrestricted generosity – and 
that Lonergan acknowledges this very agape 
as the Alpha and Omega of a universal drive 
to self-transcendence.   (From privately 
printed announcement of workshop)  
 
This is a subject – the subject of love in Lonergan 
and Kierkegaard – about which I wish to learn 
more.  
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    Kierkegaard’s Attack upon Assistant Professors: 
Proof  of  the Importance of  Systematic Theology 
Lawrence B. Porter, Ph.D. 
 I have always been interested in learning 
more about Kierkegaard because, though he 
looms as an important figure in modern Christian 
thought, my education has provided me with very 
limited exposure to him.  As an undergraduate 
English major I once was assigned to read his Fear 
and Trembling as an example of 19th-century ro-
mantic, that is, emotive, anti-rational and per-
haps overly imaginative, interpretation of an an-
cient text (the account in the book of Genesis of 
the patriarch Abraham‘s near sacrificial slaying 
of his son Isaac).  But in all my studies at a Catho-
lic seminary, Kierkegaard was referred to only in 
passing.  Nor was he treated significantly in my 
graduate studies at a non-denominational Protes-
tant divinity school.  However, despite his absence 
from the curriculum at that divinity school, more 
than once I saw evidence there of Kierkegaard‘s 
influence upon faculty and students.  For exam-
ple, an evangelical student, a friend of mine, was 
always reading Kierkegaard for spiritual comfort.  
I seem to recall him always accompanied by a 
copy of Kierkegaard‘s Training in Christianity. On 
the other hand, one of my professors at that same 
school, a man of pronounced liberal theological 
persuasion, more than once made reference to 
Kierkegaard‘s scornful attacks upon 
―Christendom‖ and its clergy as support for that 
professor‘s own disdain for the Church, that is, 
any form of organized Christianity.  And so when 
I saw the announcement that Seton Hall Univer-
sity‘s Center for Catholic Studies‘ ―faculty sum-
mer seminar 2008‖ would have as its theme 
―Kierkegaard and/or Catholicism:  A Matter of 
Conjunctions,‖ I was eager to attend. 
 
 While I found Dean Cahoy‘s lectures in 
this seminar illuminating especially as regards 
Kierkegaard‘s critique of Hegelian rationalism, I 
was not impressed by the assigned readings from 
Kierkegaard.  In fact, initially I found them per-
sonally offensive—his attacks upon organized 
religion and academic professionals could not 
help but annoy someone like myself who is an 
ordained minister and a professor.  But the more 
important thing is that on further consideration I 
found Kierkegaard‘s arguments intellectually un-
convincing and representative of a kind of pie-
tism that I feel is particularly dangerous not just 
for the Christian faith but for society in general. 
That is, while Kierkegaard‘s critique of Hegel‘s 
gross rationalization of Christianity may be at 
times quite cogent, Kierkegaard‘s alternative to 
philosophical idealism, his own biblical fideism, is 
an even more dangerous distortion of Christianity 
than Hegel‘s rationalism.  More precisely, Kierke-
gaard‘s constant appeal to blind faith and his 
deprecation of the merely human in contrast to 
the truly Christian constitutes an invitation to 
mindless religious fanaticism and denies to Chris-
tian faith a major apologetic tool, namely, its abil-
ity to appeal to what is most noble and most rea-
sonable in human nature, its moral idealism and 
rational capacity for genuine insight. 
 
I would like to illustrate this judgment 
with reference to the assigned readings, 
starting with Kierkegaard‘s writings on love.  We 
were given several selections from Kierkegaard‘s 
Works of Love:  Some Christian Reflections in the 
Form of Discourses (translated by Howard and 
Edna Hong, New York:  Harper and Row, 1962).  
In those readings, Kierkegaard constantly con-
trasts Christian love with human love, ―love . . . 
which is weak indulgence‖ with ―the love of 
which Christianity speaks‖ (p. 25), the ―purely 
human conception of love‖ (p. 169) over and 
against the infinitely superior Christian love, 
more precisely what Kierkegaard calls that 
―Christian love [which] goes from heaven to 
earth‖ (p.169) as distinguished from the all-too-
human ―friendship and erotic love‖ which pro-
ceed ―from the ground up‖ (p. 249).  I wonder if 
Kierkegaard‘s polarization, not to say caricature, 
of erotic love as simply desire for possession and 
Christian love as purely self-sacrificing love was 
the inspiration for Swedish theologian Anders 
Nygren‘s famous two-volume study called Eros 
and Agape (1930,1936) in which the author 
analyzes the connotations of two Greek words for 
love, eros as sexual love and agape as uncondi-
tional love and concludes that agape alone is truly 
Christian.  In contrast, Pope Benedict XVI in his 
first encyclical, Deus Caritas Est, in typically 
Catholic fashion, argues quite the opposite, that 
is, he insists both eros and agape are aspects of 
divine love. 
 
By mentioning the current pope, I do not mean to 
appeal to authority here.  Rather, one can ration-
 
ally argue it is patently observable, indeed, com-
mon experience that erotic attraction does not 
always lead to physical aggression.  Instead, more 
often erotic attraction is a motive for tenderness 
rather than aggression, as when a young man‘s 
strong attraction to a shapely young woman leads 
him not to impose himself upon her but rather to 
try to win her attention and favor by acts of kind-
ness and gentlemanly behavior on his part.  This 
is an example of grace building upon human na-
ture, a human nature that is not totally perverse.  
But Kierkegaard is loath to give any recognition to 
the decency of any purely human motive.  Take 
for example his critique of charitable contribu-
tions:  ―Because one makes charitable contribu-
tions, because one visits the widow and clothes 
the naked—his love is not necessarily demon-
strated or made recognizable in such deeds, for 
one can perform works of love in an unloving, 
yes, even in a self-loving way, and when this is 
so, the works of love are nevertheless not the 
work of love.‖  Once again, Kierkegaard fails to 
recognize that human self-interest need not be 
entirely selfish but can lead to virtuous, even 
Christian actions.  In this regard, it is only appro-
priate to note how the modern state uses the in-
centive of tax deductions to transform otherwise 
miserly citizens into generous benefactors of the 
community.  This is yet another example of how 
grace can build upon nature when an appeal to 
self-interest can result in virtuous behavior.  But 
Kierkegaard does not believe in the possibility of 
virtue only in what he feels is the power of blind 
faith. 
 
 Indeed, Kierkegaard‘s appeal to blind faith 
is yet another prominent and inappropriate ele-
ment in his considerations on love.  For it is not 
just that Kierkegaard cannot acknowledge the 
strange mixture of good and evil, of self interest 
and generosity in each person, he also denies us 
the use of our rational faculties.  I am referring to 
how Kierkegaard, in these his writings on love, 
constantly ridicules discretion and judgment as 
―fastidiousness‖ (p.160, 161, 162, 163) and in-
sists that ―love is rather the closed eye of forbear-
ance and gentleness, the closed eye which does 
not see defects and imperfections,‖ (p. 159).  
Such an attitude is an invitation to tragedy as it 
was for Regine Olsen who should have exercised 
more discretion, more discernment when she first 
met this brilliant young Dane with an infinite ca-
pacity for intellectual debate but no capacity for 
emotional commitment.  One needs to use one‘s 
brain, one needs to be intelligent and discerning 
in the ways of love, making important judgments 
all along the way. 
 
 Something more can be learned from 
Kierkegaard‘s attack upon the church and the 
academy, organized religion and university pro-
fessors.  These attacks appeared in 21 articles 
written for The Fatherland, the daily newspaper 
in Copenhangen from Dec. 18, 1854 to May 26, 
1855 (they are collected in Kierkegaard‘s work 
called Attack Upon Christendom, trans. By Walter 
Lowrie (Boston:  Beacon Press, 1966, and in Prac-
tice in Christianity, No. III, trans. by Howard and 
Edna Hong, Princeton, 1991) and in another se-
ries of articles which Kierkegaard published 
shortly after the completion of his series in the 
Fatherland, but now in a broadsheet funded by 
Kierkegaard himself which he called The Moment 
or The Instant (these are collected in his Journals 
and Papers, Vol. 2, F-K, edited and translated by 
Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong, Bloomington 
and London:  Indiana University Press, 1970).  
While the articles in both The Fatherland and The 
Moment are written in patently journalistic fash-
ion, that is, often in the form of savage satire, that 
crude form must not be allowed to obscure the 
fact that Kierkegaard was utterly sincere in all he 
wrote therein, that is, he was setting forth sincere 
intellectual and religious convictions. 
 
In the January 29, 1855 issue of The Fa-
therland, Kierkegaard published an article enti-
tled, ―The Point at Issue with Bishop Martensen.‖ 
There Kierkegaard vents a veritable paroxysm of 
rage against a Danish Lutheran bishop who gave 
the eulogy at the funeral of another Danish 
bishop, one Mynster.  Kierkegaard was upset be-
cause Martensen had praised Mynster at his fu-
neral as ―a witness to the truth.‖   In one sense, 
Kierkegaard‘s attack upon Martensen is pathetic 
and inappropriate.  To this day eulogies of the 
dead often tend to be unrealistic idealizations of 
the dear departed.  Moreover, I cannot share 
Kierkegaard‘s moral indignation at the fact that 
the king of Denmark had bestowed upon Bishop 
Mynster ―the accolade of knighthood‖ (p. 21) 
when in my time the monarchy of England has 
done the same for rock stars Mick Jagger, Elton 
John, Paul McCartney, Ringo Starr, and U2 singer 
Bono. 
 
In another sense, however, something can 
be said in favor of Kierkegaard‘s critique of bour-
geois religion and, more precisely, the state 
Church of Denmark.  Here I can agree, at least in 
part. For example, I do not think 
―Constantinianism,‖ that is, state-sponsored, es-
tablished religion, is a healthy option for Christi-
anity whether Catholic or Protestant.  The Catho-
lic Church has never truly flourished under state 
sponsorship, instead, state sponsorship of Catholi-
cism—whether their ―Catholic Majesties‖ in 
Spain or their ―Apostolic Majesties‖ in Austria—
has always proven more counter-productive than 
truly supportive.  Indeed, if contemporary Mexico 
is any example, the church has always benefited 
more from persecution by the state rather than 
support from the state.  Also, to some degree I can 
identify with Kierkegaard‘s criticism of bourgeois 
Christianity.  I have in mind the politically cor-
rect, socially accommodated, ―preeminently rea-
sonable‖ Christianity of contemporary, American 
Catholic politicians such as Giuliani, Pelosi and 
Kennedy.  However, after having said all this I 
also think it is important to be balanced when 
making such a judgment about the faith or sin-
cerity of individuals.  Even among Jesus‘ hand 
picked inner circle there is observable varying 
degrees of commitment, besides the loyalty of 
John the beloved disciple to the very end (Jn 
19.25-26), there is also the treachery of Judas (Jn 
13.21-30), the waffling of Peter (Jn 13.36-38), 
the doubting of Thomas (Jn 20.24-25) and the 
incomprehension of Philip (John 14.9, ―Have I 
been with you for so long a time and you still do 
not know me, Philip?‖  In pointing to these multi-
ple biblical references I am trying to be compre-
hensive and systematic in my theologizing.  That 
is, I am trying to be ―scientific‖ in the sense of 
systematically taking account of all the available 
evidence.  Good theology must do that.  Anything 
less is sheer opportunism, or worse, dishonesty, 
purely adventitious and manipulative, Bible-
quoting. Unfortunately, this is often what I find 
Kierkegaard is doing.  All too often Kierkegaard 
refuses to be comprehensive and systematic and 
instead arbitrarily insists upon seeing everything 
in terms of radical polarities, moral antitheses.  
For Kierkegaard there are only ―true Christians‖ 
and false Christians or what he prefers to call 
hypocrites.  But the truth is much more complex 
and the gospels, as we have seen, make it clear 
there is a considerable variety among Christians:  
there are deeply committed Christians, lukewarm 
Christians, nominal Christians, uncomprehend-
ing Christians, to name but a few.  
 
A more pointed illustration of this is 
Kierkegaard‘s opportunistic and manipulative use 
of the Bible in his attack upon clergy and aca-
demics in his September 22, 1855 essay 
―Imitation‖ (it first appeared in The Moment and 
is now in Journals and Papers , Vol.2, F-K, trans 
by H. and E. Hong, Indiana University Press, 
1970) and a collection of short essays collected 
under the general title ―Professor‖ (in Journals 
and Papers, Vol. 3, L-R, pages 634-657).  Not 
only are assistant professors referred to in the 
―Imitation‖ as ―animal-creatures‖ (p.375) but in 
the ―Professor‖ the academic professional is vari-
ously and continually pilloried in such statements 
as ―the professor is the greatest satire on the 
‗apostle‘‖ (p. 638) and ―the assistant professor is 
a non-human‖ (p. 654).  The scientific study of 
religion is mocked in ―Imitation‖ as ―an insuper-
able mass of historical and learned non-
sense‖ (p.373), and in ―Professor‖ as ―speculative 
effeminacy‖ (p. 635), ―scholarship of evil‖ (p. 
657), and ―erudite, learned nonsense‖ (p. 656).  
Indeed, Kierkegaard accuses professors of having 
―invented scholarship in order to evade doing 
God‘s will‖ (p. 657).  Moreover, he proposes as 
an alternative to such pernicious scholarship his 
formation of Bible study groups:  ―If there are five 
or six like-minded people who together with me 
and without any solemn ceremonies will pledge 
themselves simply to try to understand the New 
Testament and simply strive to express its de-
mands in action, I propose to start religious meet-
ings in which I will interpret the new testament.‖  
I quote Kierkegaard at length here because his 
use of the word ―simply‖ is particularly revealing.  
Even earlier Kierkegaard had suggested we 
should ―take the New Testament and read it di-
rectly and simply‖ (p. 637). But the problem is: 
nothing in the Bible is that simple.  Quite the con-
trary, all the words of Jesus cry out for learned, 
historically informed, interpretation.   
 
An example of this is Kierkegaard‘s exalta-
tion of ―Christian poverty‖ over and against the 
idea that a Christian teacher should be paid.  In 
his March 1855 article in The Fatherland entitled, 
―What do I want?‖ he says:  ―A teacher is paid, let 
us say, several thousand.  If then we suppress the 
Christian standard and apply the ordinary human 
rule, that it is a matter of course a man should 
receive a wage for his labor, a wage sufficient to 
support a family, and a considerable wage to en-
able him to enjoy the consideration due to a gov-
ernment official—then a few thousand a year is 
certainly not much.  On the other hand, as soon 
as the Christian requirement of poverty is 
brought to bear, family is a luxury, and several 
thousand is very high pay,‖ (p. 38 Attack upon 
Christendom, 1966). 
 
This passage is replete with irony, the 
irony that Kierkegaard never held a paying job in 
his life and instead lived off of a substantial in-
heritance and those very reasons was able to pub-
lish many more books and essays than most pro-
fessors might ever hope to publish.  But the more 
serious problem is Kierkegaard‘s abuse of Chris-
tian doctrine regarding wealth and poverty.  The 
NT witness on the subject of money is abundant, 
and, at times, apparently conflicting.  But if that 
witness is systematically surveyed, a balanced, 
logical argument becomes evident.  More pre-
cisely, no doubt, at times Jesus does indeed se-
verely criticize inordinate wealth especially when 
it makes us neglectful of our neighbor as in Mark 
10.23, ―how hard it is for the rich to enter the 
kingdom of heaven.‖  And no doubt in one place 
at least Jesus invites a disciple to give up all his 
wealth and embrace poverty, his advice to the 
rich young man in Mk 10.17-27.  However, we 
must also consider we have considerable evidence 
that suggests Jesus readily accepted and was 
grateful for financial support for himself and his 
work which he received from wealthy patrons:  
Jesus accepted the support of wealthy women 
such as ―Joanna the wife of Chuza, the manager 
of Herod‘s household‖ (Lk 8.3), it was another 
wealthy patron who supplied the place for the 
last supper, ―a large upper room, well fur-
nished‖ (Lk 22.12), and, when Jesus dines with 
the wealthy Zaccheus, He pronounces a blessing 
on that man‘s house (Lk 19).  We must also con-
sider the evidence that Jesus was exquisitely sen-
sitive to the issue of just compensation for labor-
ers and strongly endorsed what Kierkegaard calls, 
―the ordinary human rule‖ that one should re-
ceive wages for one‘s labor.  In this regard it is 
important to note:  it was Jesus and not Karl Marx 
who insisted ―the laborer is worthy of his 
hire‖( Luke 10.7).  Moreover, in 1Cor 9.7-11, 
Saint Paul applies the teaching of Jesus on just 
compensation of workers for Paul‘s own defense 
of clergy compensation:  ―Who serves as a soldier 
at his own expense?  Who plants a vineyard 
without eating any of its fruit?  Who tends a flock 
without getting some of the milk?  Do I say this 
on human authority?  Does not the law say the 
same?  For it is written in the law of Moses, ―You 
shall not muzzle an ox, when it is treading out 
the grain.‖  Is it for oxen that God is concerned?  
Does he not speak entirely for our sake?  It was 
written for our sake, because the plowman should 
plow in hope and the thresher thresh in hope of a 
share in the crop.  If we have sown spiritual good 
among you, is it too much if we reap your mate-
rial benefits?‖ 
 
 In view of all this, it is obvious Kierke-
gaard‘s attack on the modest wages of assistant 
professors and their diligent efforts to improve 
their lot in life (to publish articles so as to earn 
tenure and promotion) is an arbitrary, purely ad-
ventitious, one could even say malicious, employ-
ment of select passages from the gospel.  Strug-
gling academics deserve encouragement rather 
than savage attack. Indeed, God bless those assis-
tant, associate and full professors who can chal-
lenge self-styled prophets who use the Bible to 
their own ends (false prophets were a constant 
problem in ancient Israel—see Is 9.15, Jer 14.14, 
Ezk 13.3--and in NT times—see Mk 13.22, 
2Peter 2.1, 1Jn 4.1).  God bless those academics 
whose learned distinctions can challenge and 
keep honest, curb the excesses of, popular 
preachers, and amateur exegetes eager to lead 
others in study of the Bible. Kierkegaard himself 
needs to be cautioned:  the truth can rarely be 
caste in such simplistic formulas as either/or or 
―both/and‖, instead the bible and the NT espe-
cially makes it clear the truth is often a very com-
plex thing requiring not blind or impulsive en-
gagement but careful analysis and discernment, 
contemplation even, before commitment to any 
definitive conclusions.      
 
 And so in the end, I must conclude it is 
better that we ignore Kierkegaard‘s fideistic, vol-
untaristic plea ―just believe it‖ (Professor, p.647), 
and instead adopt the example of the Blessed Vir-
gin Mary who, when the angel Gabriel confronts 
her with his mind-boggling message, does not 
respond with mindless enthusiasm, ―Hallelujah, 
Praise the Lord.‖  Instead, Mary responds with a 
sober and challenging question, ―But how can 
this be since I do not know man?‖ (Lk 1.34).  It is 
only after she gets an answer to that important 
question that she says, ―Behold, I am the humble 
servant of the Lord.‖  Similarly, we would do well  
to take seriously the apostle Peter‘s instruction:  
―be ready to give a reason for the hope that is 
within you‖ (1Peter 3.15).  No wonder Peter has 
been called by some ―the prince of the apostles!‖  
Conversion to Christ must involve the whole per-
son, one‘s mind as well as one‘s heart.  It is im-
portant to appeal as much to the mind as to the 
heart of potential or less than perfect believers. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Idea of  Order in Soren Kierkegaard 
 
John P. Wargacki 
 
     She sang beyond the genius of the sea. 
The water never formed to mind or voice, 
Like a body wholly body, fluttering 
Its empty sleeves; and yet its mimic motion 
Made constant cry, caused constantly a cry, That 
was not ours although we understood, Inhuman, 
of the veritable ocean.  
 Wallace Stevens 
 
 Thus begins Wallace Stevens‘ ―The Idea of 
Order at Key West,‖ in which the imaginary fig-
ure of the singing woman on the shore serves as 
the central trope in the poet‘s endless quest for 
meaning, order, and beauty in ―A Universe of 
death.‖1 The complex enterprises of Danish phi-
losopher Soren Kierkegaard and often obtuse 
musings of American poet Wallace Stevens inter-
sect at the point of an artificial order – not in 
terms of the order necessarily being unreal but 
rather that this order, by definition, is artifice: a 
creation of the human imagination designed, in 
the case of Kierkegaard, to impose meaning upon 
paradox; or, in the case of Stevens, to impose the 
―idea of order‖ on a human existence predicted 
upon disorder and chaos.  Neither example, nei-
ther quest will provide answers to metaphysical 
or spiritual mysteries; neither is able to do more 
than to find or invent a pattern of reason behind 
the absurdity.  The central difference is the way 
in which the philosopher ultimately manages to 
embrace a paradox that the poet cannot.  Their 
connection then is not so much the result, but 
rather the journey and the language each must 
use to facilitate it.   
 
For Stevens, the fiercest anti-Christian 
poet of the American Modernists (perhaps the 
most anti-Christian in the entire western canon), 
his brilliant and poignant ―The Idea of Order at 
Key West,‖ keenly illustrates his reliance upon a 
resemblance of a reality – the poetry he often de-
scribed as ―The Supreme Fiction.‖  For Stevens, 
even the act of writing poetry was always, in 
some way, about poetics itself, and the result, 
though admittedly a complete fiction.  An illusion 
without substance, it was, nonetheless necessary 
to human survival.  Stevens, with only language 
at his disposal, replaces the notion of a ―Supreme 
Being‖ (God), with a ―Supreme Fiction‖ (poetry).2  
While in Key West,3 Stevens rediscovered 
that the sheer beauty of nature, which one can 
behold, ponder, and use for inspiration, neverthe-
less did not compensate for the absence of real 
love and coherence in the universe of profound 
emotional suffering.  While his own ―Blessed 
Rage for Order‖ becomes an impossible cry for a 
teleological existence in a present-tense world 
devoid of meaning, his imaginary ―she‖ seems 
able to reduce the mighty sea to a mere seascape 
of her own creation – a footnote overshadowed 
by her song,  
 
For she was the maker of the song she sang. 
The ever-hooded, tragic-gestured sea 
Was merely a place by which she walked to 
sing.  
(15-17) 
 
Here Stevens wrestles against this paradox of 
beauty and nature.  His attempt to manufacture 
order rages against reality while the creation of 
verse serves to displace the sensory existence and 
emotional abandonment with an imaginary 
dream -- his own ―supreme‖ but nonetheless un-
real ―fiction.‖ Kierkegaard, meanwhile, in so 
many ways, relies upon his own version of the 
―supreme fiction.‖  Yet if Stevens‘s result is the 
fiction of an unbeliever, it nevertheless represents 
that awkward but often sublime matrix of poetry 
and philosophy, as the two alternate universes – 
Kierkegaard‘s and Stevens‘s bend and sometimes 
break the artifice of language to express the unut-
terable: the paradoxical mystery of Eternal Love, 
the reality of God.  
  
For Stevens then all reality, even language, 
is mythic; ―the tomb in Palestine‖ remains ―…the 
grave of Jesus where he lay,‖ he concludes in 
Sunday Morning, perhaps the most blatantly anti-
Christian poem of the 20th Century.  Still he can-
not help but puzzle over and struggle against 
what human mind and the human heart can both 
create but, perhaps, never realize – ―an idea of 
order‖ only.  He concludes:     
 
Ramon Fernandez, tell me, if you know, 
Why, when the singing ended and we turned  
Toward the town, tell why the glassy lights, 
The lights in the fishing boats at anchor there, 
As the night descended, tilting in the air, 
Mastered the night and portioned out the sea, 
Fixing emblazoned zones and fiery poles, 
Arranging, deepening, enchanting night.  
 
Oh! Blessed rage for order, pale Ramon, 
The maker's rage to order words of the sea, 
Words of the fragrant portals, dimly-starred, 
And of ourselves and of our origins, 
In ghostlier demarcations, keener sounds.
   (44-55) 
 
In his ―Works of Love‖ and elsewhere, Kierke-
gaard‘s philosophy demands so much more of his 
words, and he demands so much more than a 
mere ―idea‖  -- even in terms of his own  deep 
personal struggles: 
 
   What wonderful recollections the lover ac-
quires as thanks for all his labour!  Ina sense 
he can pack his whole life together in a dash.  
He can say: I have laboured in spite of every-
one, early and late, but what have I accom-
plished – a dash!...I have suffered as heavily as 
any man, inwardly as only love can suffer, but 
what have I gained – a dash!     (259-60) 
 
Stevens must be content with a dash, and thrust 
his existence thoroughly into the only semblance 
of truth: a ―fiction,‖ an ―idea of order.‖  The 
paradox of ―a happy people in an unhappy  
world--‖4  is beyond comprehension, it is beyond 
belief, utterly hopeless, and worse, it cannot be 
made whole even by language.  Kierkegaard, 
seemingly undaunted by the same paradox, un-
wittingly retorts, reiterating: 
 
   Is, then, the life of the lover wasted, has he 
lived entirely in vain, Since there is nothing, 
absolutely nothing, which witnesses to his 
work? Answer: is seeking one‘s own the wast-
ing of one‘s life?  No, in truth, this life is not 
wasted.  This the lover knows in blessed joy in 
himself and with God…he is completely and 
wholly transformed into being simply an ac-
tive power in the hands of God. (260) 
 
As St. John of the Cross came to realize in ―Dark 
Night of Soul,‖5 God (Christ) forms both nexus 
and solution to paradox – the paradox of being 
completely alone in the universe, even insomuch 
as to create a woman who might sing ―beyond the 
genius of the sea,‖ but who cannot replace a 
woman‘s flesh and blood.  The transformation, 
Kierkegaard reminds us, is not in the ―supreme 
fiction‖ but in the ―supreme truth‖ – the reality of 
God‘s love, expressed most paradoxically in the 
Incarnation - even when the tropical night is cold 
and the dark sky and sea are impossible to distin-
guish. 
 
Endnotes 
 
1.  In John Milton‘s Paradise Lost, Satan de-
scribes hell, or Pandemonium, as: A  
A Universe of death, which God by curse Created evil, 
for evil only good.(Book II 622-23). 
 
2.   A vice president for the Hartford Insur-
ance company, Stevens‘s domestic life was, as critic 
Denis Donoghue once described it, to be ―somewhere 
between desolate and bleak.‖  Unsatisfied with work 
alone and miserable in his marriage, Stevens‘s, an 
atheist, sought solace in the writing of poetry, what he 
described as ―The Supreme Fiction.‖  
 
3.  Stevens‘s many travels, especially to the 
Florida Keys, often served to reinforce his that chaotic 
universe can only be ordered by the imagination, 
finding no satisfaction his relationships, poetry serves 
Stevens as both an escape and means of survival.  
 
4.   In the final section of ―The Auroras of Au-
tumn,‖ perhaps Stevens‘s most ambitious attempt to 
create order from chaos as he observes the Northern 
Lights, he presents four scenarios: ―An unhappy peo-
ple in an unhappy world‖; ―A happy people in an un-
happy world‖; ―A happy people in a happy world‖; 
and, ―An unhappy people in a happy world,‖ all of 
which he rejects as:  
 
 This contrivance of the spectre of spheres, 
Contriving balance to contrive a whole,
 (Stanza X) 
 
5. St. John of the Cross, a 16th century Carme-
lite mystic, is considered by many critics to be the 
strongest writer in the Spanish language after Miguel 
De Cervantes.  His ―Dark Night of the Soul,‖ written 
while isolated in prison, celebrates his ―mystical un-
ion‖ with Christ expressed in sexual terms.  Void of all 
other human contact, the poet‘s spiritual union with 
the Word Incarnate is metaphorized as secret lovers 
meeting in the night.      
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